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Opposition Strategy and
Survival in
Praetorian Brazil, 1964-79

Dale Krane
Mississippi State University
Opposition groups in authoritarian political systems are constrained not only by the
presence of coercive forces, but also by the indeterminate and uncertain application of repression. This article suggests the use of Albert Hirschman's rational model of dissent as an
analytic framework for the study of interest articulation within mixed regimes. After deriving several behavioral attributes associated with dissent, the article then explores the utility of
the Hirschman model within the Brazilian context. Several political strategies that allowed
opposition forces to survive more than a decade of severe repression by the praetorian regime
are examined. Political "safety zones" that permit opposition forces to avoid or neutralize
repressive constraints also are identified. The article concludes with an assessment of the
framework's potential for comparative research.

In April, 1964 the armed forces of Brazil deposed civilian President Joao
Goulart and established a praetorian regime that has ruled the country
for the last eighteen years (Schneider, 1971; Stepan, 1971; Flynn, 1978).
True to the normal pattern of a coup d' etat (Nordlinger, 1977, pp.
112-113), the military acted to shrink the size of the political arena in
order to stabilize what they and supportive civilian groups perceived to be
a chaotic and threatening situation (Skidmore, 1967). Despite the often
brutal and notorious attempts to curtail certain types of political activity,
some opposition and dissent to the authoritarian government have
managed to survive. In fact, the opposition's strength has grown over the
years to the point where the current military president, Joao Baptista
Figueiredo, now presides over a government-sponsored democratization
plan, known as abertura or "opening" (Levine, 1980, pp. 49-50). 1
*This article is a revised version of a paper delivered at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the
Southern Political Science Association. The advice and support of Maurice Simon, Donald
Kelley, and Paul Beck as well as several anonymous reviewers have improved this essay.
1 Included in the major changes of the Figueiredo Administration's abertura policy are (a)
the revocation of certain constitutional articles (e.g., 185 and 477) and institutional acts (e.g.,
AI-5) that have served as the legal basis for violating the protections on civil liberties listed in
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The collapse of freely elected civilian governments and their replacement by various types of authoritarian regimes have been a major topic of
comparative research since the rise of European fascism. Analysis of the
reverse process by which authoritarian forms give way to more
democratic ones has been studied only recently. Much of this new
scholarship has focused on the internal dynamics of the ruling groups and
institutions (Huntington and Moore, 1970). Less attention has been paid·
to the role of the opposition (McLennan, 1973; Chalmer and Robinson,
1980). This article suggests an analytic framework for the study of opposition forces within an authoritarian political system and then explores
the utility of that framework within the Brazilian context. Before proceeding, it will be useful to indicate what this article does not purport to
do. First, this essay does not chronicle in sequential fashion recent
Brazilian political history. The time frame selected for analysis covers
the period from the onset of military authoritarianism in 1964 until the
government's implementation of the "opening to democracy" in 1979, a
watershed year which "witnessed the most dramatic changes in Brazilian
political atmosphere since the ouster of Joao Goulart 15 years earlier"
(Levine, 1980, p. 49). Second, partly for conceptual reasons and partly
because it has been done elsewhere (Fleischer, 1979; 1980), no attempt is
made at an indepth examination of the Brazilian political party system.
Instead, this article concentrates on the identification of political
strategies that allowed opposition forces to survive more than a decade of
severe repression by the praetorian regime. Thus, along with gaining insights into the politics of Brazil, the purpose of this essay is to introduce a
conceptual framework for the study of opposition movements and to
assess the analytic potential of the framework.
the 1946 Constitution; (b) the re-establishment of habeas corpus and judicial supremacy; (c)
the withdrawal of the presidential prerogative to suspend federal , state, and local elected of.
ficials; (d) a broad amnesty decree for persons convicted of non·violent political crimes
against the regime; and (e) the reorganization of the political party and election rules to permit a multiparty system (see Latin American Index, Vols. VI and VII).
Debate still continues about the scope and effect of the abertura policy. Some observers
(e.g., Alves, 1981, p . 9) argue that although the changes have "resulted in real gains, these
have been limited to granting crucial individual rights guarantees ... it does not wa.rrant the
common characterization of a period of transition to democracy." Contrasting views can be
seen in Pang's (1981, p. 57) observation that, "the designers of the policy of abertura want to
use it as a vehicle to provide a credible degree of political democracy and social reforms ... "
Levine (1982, p. 60) likewise points out that," . .. the events of 1981 demonstrated that abertura (literally 'opening') had penetrated more deeply into society than had previously been
imagined and had affected more people's lives."
Evaluations of abertura, of course, depend on one's definition of democracy. Objectively,
the changes have made a significant step toward a rule of law, ended the state of eme{gency
powers of the president, and allowed for the return from exile of over 4,500 individuals, many
of whom have been prominent opponents of the regime.
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THE PARTICIPATION DILEMMAS WITHIN MIXED REGIMES

Since its inception the praetorian government of Brazil has struggled
with what Dahl (1973, p. 13) terms "the dilemma of mixed regimes." Encompassing the complete range of governments that fall between
democratic and totalitarian states, mixed regimes vary from one-party
states with universal suffrage to competitive oligarchies. According to
Dahl (1973, pp. 13-18), mixed regimes normally tolerate some form of
"loyal" opposition and/or find it difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate
all "disloyal" opposition. Because the rulers of these diverse governments
deliberately choose not to install a comprehensive police state, yet refuse
to permit wide-open participation, mixed regimes become caught in a
Catch-22 situation: "if they could tolerate some opposition, could they indefinitely enforce any limits to toleration-short of the wide limits set in
polyarchies?" (Dahl, 1973, p. 13). Consequently, "mixed regimes are
prone to oscillate between liberalization and repression" (Dahl, 1973,
p. 18).
Between 1964 and 1979 four successive military administrations in
Brazil tried to escape this participation dilemma by searching for a
balance between continued praetorian domination of society and
unrestrained political competition. Having created neither a totalitarian
nor a democratic government, 2 the Brazilian military found itself in the
politically painful quandary of mixed regimes. From the leadership's
perspective, rapid movement in either direction posed twin dangers. To
yield to demands for liberalization risked an uncontrolled chain reaction
of repressed political interests that could lead to a polyarchy and
ultimately to a redistribution of political and economic power. Conversely, if the forces for liberation overtly threatened the regime's principal allies, the degree of suppression required to gain control of runaway
political elements might well have transformed the mixed regime into a
totalitarian state.
In fact, the one constancy about political participation in Brazil during
this period was the remarkable fluctuation in the degree of political suppression. Government policy toward newspapers from 1964 to 1979 conveniently illustrates this raising and lowering of the barriers to political
expression common in mixed regimes. At one time or another, some
Brazilian newspapers were closed, articles were deleted, and strict censorship imposed. But, at other times the same newspapers published direct
2 A totalitarian situation in Brazil would be unacceptable to many of the praetorian
regime's allies primarily because of the restraints on the international flow of capital and
probable loss of some markets. Other reasons include Brazil's image overseas and the sheer
cost of a comprehensive and effective police state apparatus, as well as a police state's impact
on the quality of life even for the regime's allies.
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attacks on important public policies, exposed serious scandals involving
major government officials, and even printed various forms of humor
ridiculing the foibles of the military rulers (Pierce, 1979). This expansion
and contraction of publishing limits fits neatly with Dahl's description of
ruler behavior in mixed regimes.
However, just as the pressure for liberalization and the counterpressures for continued suppression cause a mixed regime to waffle as to
the exact boundaries of permissible public debate, so also do the repressed
groups find themselves in a political dilemma. Viewed from the opposition's perspective, the narrow but indeterminate limits on interest articulation in a mixed regime likewise pose serious strategic problems. To
abide by the regime's guidelines means to acquiesce to prevailing political
arrangements. On the other hand, to defy the government means to risk
political and even physical liquidation. As Linz (1973, pp. 219-226)
clearly explains, it is evident that the varying degrees of "semifreedom"
found in a mixed regime act as a political puzzle for rulers and ruled alike.
Sensitivity to both sides of the participatory dilemma must be incorporated into theoretical propositions about the political dynamics of
authoritarian systems. Though it has been commonplace to report the
composition of dissident movements and the troubles besetting them, not
many studies go beyond the level of chronological description and attempt to develop an analytic framework. For example, numerous accounts of opposition politics contain substantial detail on personalities
and coalitions but offer no insights into the strategies governing opposition actions. Similarly, some studies succumb to the "drama" of guerrilla
theater by trying to capture the modus operandi of the rebels. Other
analyses, lured by the temptation of data availability, focus on "sectoral"
or "corporatist" groups that actively cooperate with the regime in making
and implementing policy. 3 Unfortunately, few concepts that can serve as
a foundation for cross-cultural comparison of opposition behavior emerge
from this literature.
As an exploratory effort to probe the opposition's difficulties with the
participation dilemmas of mixed regimes, this essay concentrates on the
strategy of political actors who belong to neither government-sponsored
corporatist structures nor underground cells of active resistance.
Operating within the ever-shifting zone of "semifreedom," these individuals and groups strive for basic institutional and/or policy changes
while attempting to avoid the extremes of coopted loyalty to or violent rejection of the mixed regime. Gino Germani (1970, p. 368) in his eight3 To categorize sectoral or corporatist groups as part of an authoritarian regime's opposition is somewhat misleading. The main thrust of corporatist writing demonstrates that these
governmentally organized syndicates constitute one of the main pillars of mixed and
hegemonic regimes.

32

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL.

45, 1983

fold categorization of citizen responses to authoritarian governments
recognizes this class of political behavior and labels it "active
deviationist."4 This special type of citizen in the mixed regime articulates
opposition to prevailing policy without the institutional protection
available within government-sponsored corporatist channels and without
the physical protection afforded by membership in a clandestine group.
By foregoing the resources of legitimacy or weapons, this "active deviationist" (individual or group) must rely on more fragile political resources
and must devise finely tuned strategies of political and physical survival.
Analysis of their methods and strategies of expression not only will illuminate how such citizens manage to survive, but also will contribute to the
general understanding of policy formulation in nondemocratic systems.
AN "INDIVIDUALISTic"

MonEL

OF DISSENT

A substantial portion of the literature on opposition politics starts from
the governmental side of the participation dilemma. Discussions of opposition and dissent are approached from the logical emphasis on the institutions, processes, and dynamics of mixed regimes. One of the most
typical research questions asked is: how does an authoritarian government stay in power? Theoretical struggles with this theme usually produce typologies derived from a rather small number of analytic dimensions. Among the more popular categories are: (1) the degree of mass
participation, (2) the extent of regime legitimacy, (3) the degree of
political suppression, and (4) the power capacity of the political system
(Blondel, 1969; Huntington and Moore, 1970; Almond and Powell,
1978). Whatever the chosen dimensions, the analytic perspective stays
fixed on the organizational and operational problems of the authoritarian
government.
Another common approach to mixed regimes employs political parties
as the unit of analysis. The advantage here, of course, is that the oneparty state can be equated, ipso facto, with an authoritarian regime. This
labor-saving distinction yields many research benefits. For example,
descriptions of authoritarian policy initiation, adoption, and implementation can be hung neatly onto a standard structural and behavioral
analysis of the single party. Similarly, many important insights about interest articulation within the authoritarian setting can be gained from
following the internal maneuverings of intraparty factions. Again,
however, the theoretical attack centers on the authority and power of the
government and/or the dominant political party.
4 Also see Juan Linz (1973a, pp. 211-319) for a discussion of the alegal opposition, which is
defined as "dissidents who can prove that they have an initial identification with the system,
or have evolved to their position out of the tendencies within the system ... "
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By an explanatory switch to the other side of the participation dilemma, a fuller understanding of opposition politics can be obtained. Imposing systematic order on such slippery aspects of dissent as origins,
motives, themes, and strategies demands a conceptual scheme which
adopts the individual as the unit of analysis. Equally important, the
uncertainties, the choices, and the consequences of interest articulation
within a zone of "semifreedom" must be incorporated into any proposed
framework for opposition politics. Admittedly, developing propositions
about the behavioral attributes of opposition forces is no easy task.
Several years ago Albert Hirschman (1970) developed a rational model
of membership response to the problem of decline, or "repairable lapses,"
in the performance of economic and political organizations. His identification of the options open to consumers/members who dislike the way
things are going in a particular firm/organization makes Hirschman's conceptualization especially applicable to the opposition side of the participation dilemma. Normally, people are loyal to a given firm/organization; that is, considerable deterioration must set in before discontent
builds up. 5 If the situation begins to worsen, individuals can choose to
remain passive and tolerate lower levels of performance (i.e., loyalist
behavior). But to prevent further decline or to recuperate previous levels
of performance individuals can select from two alternative options: exit
and voice. Exit refers to the economist's standard remedy for consumer
dissatisfaction - switching to a competing product or leaving the
organization. · To resort to voice
. .. is for the customer or member to make an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and
outputs of the firm from which one buys or of the organization to which one belongs. Voice
is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than escape from, an objectionable state
of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management directly in
charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in
management, or through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant
to mobilize public opinion (Hirschman, 1970, p. 30).

Although voice can be overdone (i.e., protests can hinder rather than help
recovery) , "voice has the function of alerting a firm or organization to its
failings." Because voice "must then give management, old or new, some
time to respond to the pressures that have been brought to bear on it"
(Hirschman, 1970, p. 33), voice in comparison to exit is a more restrained
option for initiating change within a firm/organization.
s A classic example of a voicer referring to this wait for "management" to rectify its
deteriorating ways is, of course, Thomas Jefferson's statement in The D eclaration of In·
dependence: "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be
changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that
mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by
abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."
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Though exit and voice are alternative modes of action, voice is the more
difficult or, as Hirschman puts it, the more "messy" option. Usually, an
individual selects between loyalty and exit; but when the exit option is
unavailable or costly, then voice is the only remaining course of action. 6
From this, it is an easy step to postulate that voice arises from
discontented, but nonexiting consumers/members. In particular,
Hirschman suggests that firms and organizations do business with a mixture of alert and inert customers. As he explains, a given deterioration in
quality will inflict very different losses on different customers (because
the appreciation of quality varies greatly). The alert customer or "connoisseur" would be most prone to exit if quality declines (Hirschman,
1970, p. 48). However, if exit is blocked as it is in authoritarian settings
(e.g., the refusal to grant passports), 7 then politically alert citizens ("connoisseurs") must voice their dissatisfaction if they wish to reverse government decline. But, "for voice to function properly, it is necessary that individuals possess reserves of political influence which they can bring into
play when they are sufficiently aroused" (Hirschman, 1970, p. 70).
Translated into propositional form, the source of voice will be citizens
who believe they possess enough political resources (and interest and information) to influence a regime's actions. Conversely, politically inert
or uneducated citizens (e.g., peasants) will be absent from the choir of
"voicers."
Due to the differential impact of quality decline, different individuals
will voice distinctive complaints. Products for which ready substitutes
exist permit easy exit. On the other hand, products which are unique
make exit costly. In regard to public goods and services, Hirschman
theorizes that declines in capital-intensive or tangible good public activities like parks, roads, and sanitation will provoke less "voice" than
declines in labor-intensive or personal service public activities such as
education, health, and law enforcement. Interestingly, voice is held to
be the most likely and most important response to declines in what
Hirschman (1970, pp. 52-53) calls "quality of life" products (e.g., civil
liberties) . Complaints can be registered about product quality (e.g.,
substantive public policy) as well as product production and delivery
(e.g., procedural public policy). Voiced complaints also vary as to the
thematic emphasis on the personalistic effects of quality decline versus the
broader, community-wide effects of quality decline. One can

6

To amplify this point Hirschman refers to the Soviet Union.
Hirschman (1970, p. 61) notes that exit is a function of the ease of leaving the country
and living in another culture/nation. As an example, he points to the common flight by
Argentine dissidents to Uruguay.
1
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hypothesize that voicing personal hardship is politically easier and safer
than voicing communal hardship. 8
If voice is the most difficult of the three options, why do persons select
it? Hirschman (1970, pp. 37-38) answers this question by listing a
number of viewpoints typical of "votcers." First, "voicers" are individuals who prefer to remain with the firm/organization and expect it
to recover its original superiority over competitors. Second, "voicers"
feel that they must "do something" and that they can have an impact.
Third , "voicers" expect other individuals to join them in expressing
dissatisfaction, and thus expect to be successful. To put this another
way, individuals justify voice behavior with the hope of putting the
firm /organization "back on the track." This hope is reinforced by the
belief that they, in fact, can point out the way back and that others will
actively support their vision of quality. In a sense, "voicers" feel they
have "no where else to go," and therefore they have maximum incentive
to articulate dissatisfaction with deterioration in product quality.

Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in a Praetorian Context
The first step in applying Hirschman's framework to interest articulation in authoritarian settings is the separation of "voicers" from "exiters"
and "loyalists." The physical action of exiters makes identification
relatively simple. Since the abandonment or the destruction of primordial social institutions such as the family, the tribe, the church, and the
state is ordinarily unthinkable (Hirschman, 1970, p. 76), individuals will
be classified as having chosen to exit if: (1) they participate in any group
committed to armed struggle against the mixed regime (e.g., the VARPalmares Revolutionary Avant-Garde, an urban guerrilla group that
operated in Brazil during the late 1960s and early 1970s), or (2) they leave
the country voluntarily- that is, not under imminent threat of arrest or
actual banishment. 9 To vote with one's feet is to walk away from the
deteriorating firm /organization; to vote with bullets and bombs is to
demolish the deteriorating firm/organization.l 0 Although their methods
may seem poles apart, defectors and terrorists, unlike voicers, have given
up the hope of putting the firm/organization "back on track." In contrast, "voice always involves the decision to 'stick' with the deteriorating
firm/organization" (Hirschman, 1970, p. 38).
8 Some authoritarian governments have legitimized personal discontent with the delivery
of public services. Poland for some time has had a television show that acts as an "ombudsman" for citizen complaints with local public services (e.g., sanitation).
9 Martyrdom, of course, is the ultimate form of exit!
1o Barghoorn's (1973, p. 70) typology of Russian opposition movements includes one
category labeled "subversive opposition" which he characterizes as "system-rejective."
Members of such subversive groups engage in violence because they believe in a vision of the
future that encompasses a different type of hegemonic regime.
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Distinguishing between "voicers" and "loyalists" is relatively more complex because voice always includes an element of loyalty (Hirschman,
1970, p. 82). That is, both loyalists and voicers choose to stay with the
firm/organization because both types of individuals usually "care" about
the firm/organization 's fate. Loyalists and voicers part company over the
appropriate response to deterioration. According to Hirschman (1970, p.
38), loyalists: (1) refuse to leave the firm/organization, (2) refuse to actively participate in actions designed to change the firm/organization's
policies, (3) suffer in silence, confident that things will soon get better,
and (4) often exhibit an irrational attachment to the firm/organization.
Furthermore, loyalists are less likely to perceive deterioration or believe
that they can continue to receive enough benefits to outweigh the costs of
exit or of voice (Hirschman, 1970, p. 99). In a phrase, loyalists differentially tolerate lower quality levels than voicers. Because loyalists are
easier to satisfy, they will continue active support (either in the form of
buying the deteriorating product or remaining within the declining
organization) in spite of their dissatisfaction.
In the application of Hirschman's propositions to the praetorian context
loyalists are citizens who refuse to exit or voice despite disagreements with
the regime. Loyalists can be identified not only by a "my country right or
wrong" attitude, but also by their willingness to behave in accordance
with government guidelines or remain dependent on government favors.
In addition, individuals who disagree with the regime but refuse to articulate their discontent also fall into the loyalist category. Examples of
Brazilian loyalists abound; they would include the industrializing
bourgeoisie, the military officer corps, and the civil service. The "loyalty" of individuals belonging to these groups can be directly associated
with the benefits that have accrued to them from the post-1964 regime's
policies (Flynn, 1978, p. 529).
Government-sponsored occupational syndicates have constituted a second type of "loyal" political organization in Brazil. These numerous corporatist structures are held to be the "cornerstone of the sistema" (the
Brazilian "establishment") because their recognition, finances, leadership, and membership benefits come from the government (Schmitter,
1973, pp. 206-209). Whether the sindicatos were controlled through the
direct use of pelegos (pro-government agents operating within the
organization) or more simply through the licensing of a single legal
association for each occupation, this type of economic organization
allowed the government to "eliminate spontaneous interest articulation
and establish a limited number of authoritatively recognized groups that
interact with the government apparatus in defined and regularized ways"
(Malloy, 1977, p. 4). Given this dependency on the regime's
benevolence, sindicato members in their official capacities should be con-
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. sidered loyalists. This classification does not preclude a natural difference of opinion between sindicato members and the government over
the exact slice of the public pie destined for the group. Although corporatist structures permitted the Brazilian state to subordinate civil society, the corporatist arrangement also permitted "the opening of institutionalized areas of the state to the representation of organized interests of
civil society" (O'Donnell, 1977, p. 48). That is, corporatism, like any
control structure, involves a reciprocal bargain (Cyert and March, 1963,
p. 33) and thus patron-client loyalty often yields mutual socioeconomic
benefits for both parties (Chalmers, 1972, pp. 61-76; Collier and Collier,
1977, pp. 489-512). From a more comparative perspective, systemacceptive groups organized along economic sectoral lines operate legally
in many different political systems, and may articulate "programmatic"
positions not necessarily in agreement with policies pursued by the regime
in regard to the sector's salient interests without being considered disloyal.
Privately organized interest groups comprise another potential source
of regime loyalists. Some social and economic groups can choose
deliberately to grant or withhold allegiance to the regime. For example,
some private groups have been among the Brazilian regime's most enthusiastic boosters, as exemplified by the Sao Paulo business community,
especially its more rabid members who "contributed (funds) to official
bodies of repression" (Banderia, 1975, p. 204). In other situations private
groups may swing back and forth between loyalty and vocal opposition,
such as the Catholic hierarchy and some elements of the mass media. At
the individual level, citizens may choose to express loyalty by casting their
ballot for the pro-government party or they may choose other less loyal
options, including voting for an officially permitted opposition party
(e.g., the MDB) or by casting a blank ballot.U
Because choice of response to deterioration lies at the heart of
Hirschman's conceptualization, his model considers inaction as a
manifestation of loyalty. To acquiesce passively or to withdraw (even in
despair or disgust) from political action is, for Hirschman, to remain
loyal. By this logic, then, the large numbers of apolitical or inactive
citizens in mixed regimes like Brazil embody another sizeable portion of
loyalists. In Hirschman's categorization, an individual must act to either
exit or "voice" complaints with the firm /organization's performance in
order not to be labeled as loyal. To summarize briefly, loyalists are
citizens who deliberately act to support the praetorian regime or who submit to the regime by foregoing the exit or voice options. Loyalty may
flow from one or more motives: (1) ideological or philosophical agreement
11

Although Hirschman views non.voting as a passive act and therefore a sign of loyalty,
a blank ballot should be considered "voice. •·

ca.~ting
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with the regime, (2) receipt of tangible rewards conditioned on loyalty,
(3) rational calculus over the benefits and costs of any political action visa-vis other personal priorities (Olson, 1965), and (4) inability or unwillingness to exit or voice.
"Voicers" concur with loyalists as to the importance of working within
the firm/organization, while at the same time adopting a product and/or
system-disapproving stance. Voice aims at securing change-e.g., inclusive participation- by working within the regime or by engaging in
acts held to be illega1 only in dictatorships. Exit, by comparison, seeks
change from outside the regime or through system-rejective actions which
would be regarded as criminal by most, if not all, governments. As
dissatisfied, non-exiting customers/members, voicers repudiate the
motives and means of both loyalists and exiters. That is, voicers
deliberately choose to maneuver politically between the extremes of
allegiance and antagonism, between enthusiasm and enmity, and between collaboration and conflict.
Even though Hirschman alludes to voice strategies only briefly, nevertheless his comments supply clues to some provocative hypotheses about
the character of voicers. First, voice will not be limited to career politicians, but will emanate from a range of individuals with diversified
backgrounds. Second, because voice can take many forms, its use requires inventiveness. In a mixed regime, this observation is especially apt
when read in the light of Hirschman's view that voice will be more effective if it is direct, straightforward, and public. At first glance, close
adherence to this prescription would seem to guarantee a quick trip to the
nearest jail. Hirschman (1970, p. 100), however, proposes an intriguing
and risky solution: the threat of exit. Since "connoisseurs" are valuable
customers/members, their exit would accelerate quality decline and, thus,
the firm/organization needs to retain some "connoisseurs." This means
that prominent or popular persons from various societal sectors can exert
some leverage with an authoritarian regime. As an example, Hirschman
notes the blow to a government's legitimacy caused by the resignation-inprotest of an important official. Consequently, political "connoisseurs"
can voice with a considerable, though indeterminate, range of volume
and have some sense of protection from serious reprisal.
Trying to maintain this delicate balance between loyalty and system rejection imposes on voicers a politics of survival within the shifting limits of
permitted interest articulation. Solitary individuals, groups of various
sorts, and well-established institutions may choose the voice option.
Levine (1979, p. 83) in describing the growing pressure for an opening
(abertura) to democracy in 1978 illustrates this diversity of Brazilian
voices:
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The major issue in the campaign for increased democratic'freedom is amnesty for the regime's
enemies and former exiles who have returned home but whose political voices have been
silenced. Some have also advocated amnesty for the torturers and agents of repression to
achieve a state of national forgiveness. Archbishop Arns has been deeply involved in the
amnesty campaign; so are the National Conference of Bishops, Dalmo Dalleri, a leading
lawyer; feminist Terezinha Zerbini; Bentes Monteiro; and General Pery Constant Bevilaqua,
a conservative, legalist army officer dismissed under the Institutional Act, AI-5.

What these individuals and institutions (as well as others described in
following sections) had in common was a willingness "to trade off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of an improvement in the
deteriorating product ... and the estimate customers/members have of
their ability to influence the organization" (Hirschman, 1970, p. 77).
Voicers, in summary, are alert citizens who act to terminate product
and/or organizational decline by bringing their influence to bear on the
firm/organization's policy making.
For the purpose of imposing a rudimentary conceptual order on opposition politics in a mixed regime, four behavioral dimensions can be derived
from Hirschman's model of voice behavior (see Table 1). The first
dimension indicates the source of dissatisfaction. Are complaints coming
from a "voice crying in the wilderness," from a small informal group,
from an organization, or from an alliance of several groups? The next
pattern considers the scope of the remedy sought to repair the lapse in
governmental quality. Does the voice seek merely a personal redress of
grievances, a group benefit, a class action, or a nationwide change? The
third property refers to the opposed policy's centrality to the regime's own
interests and operations. Has the complaint been lodged against a trivial
concern, against some less-than-vital national policy, against a specific
but critical national policy, or against the very nature of the regime and
all its works? A fourth behavioral attribute encompasses the "publicness"
versus the anonymity of the voiced complaint. Is the discontent voiced in
an open, direct, straightforward fashion, is it expressed from behind a
collective smoke screen, is it circulated as an anonymous declaration, or is
the complaint only discovered by "reading between the lines" of a seemingly innocuous document? 12
TABLE

1

BEHAVIORAL ATTIIIBUTES OF OPPOSITION "VOICE"

Source
Remedy
Policy Opposed
Strategy Used

Individual
Personal
Marginal To Regime
Direct

Alliance
Communal
Central To Regime
Disguised

Usually, frontal assaults on a mixed regime will be camouflaged, especially if the level of
repression is high.
12
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Despite some obvious difficulties of operationalization, the behavioral
properties of voice derived from Hirschman's analytic framework have
the potential to advance the study of opposition politics along several
fronts. Most directly, this individualistic approach can rectify the anecdotal character of much of the previous literature. Second, the development of behavioral attributes of opposition voice also allows the theorist
to combine them into additional propositions suitable for research (see
Appendix). And finally, the explanatory shift to the opposition's
strategies for coping with political suppression in a "semifree" environment adds a completeness to the study of the participation dilemmas
within mixed regimes.
5Brazilian Impediments to Voice
A brief review of the significant obstacles to interest articulation in
Brazil will furnish a practical background to this exploration of voice
behavior using the Hirschman framework. Over the past eighteen years,
the Brazilian praetorian regime has defined and redefined the boundaries
of permissible political expression. A continuous stream of institutional
acts, complementary acts, decree laws, and other "instructions" has been
used as the regime's principal legal instruments for molding the political
arena. As Roett (1972, p. 145) observes, "The Institutional Acts are a
significant and interesting departure in Brazilian political life" and "constitute the justification for military intervention." Because almost every
facet of politics was touched in some way by these restrictive regulations,
an outline of a few of the more relevant and notorious edicts will convey a
sense of the conditions that constrained voice behavior prior to the aberpolicy initiated in 1979.
tura
. InAppearing nine days after the golpe, the First Institutional Act (AI-l)
contained several provisions designed to reorganize the formal executive
and legislative processes. In addition, "it enables the Supreme Command
(of the Revolution) to suspend political rights of citizens for ten years
(cassacao) and to cancel the mandates of congressmen, state
assemblymen, and municipal councilors, with the President to enjoy the
same power for 60 days after taking office" (Schneider, 1971 , p. 127).
During 1964 the purges affected more than 3,500 individuals at the
federal level and at least the same number at the subnationallevel. 13 Included among these punitive measures were the cassation of the 3
previous civilian presidents, 116 elected representatives, 555 forced
military retirements, 165 voluntary transfers to the reserves, and 1,528
firings (Schneider, 1971, pp. 199-200). Subsequent institutional acts ex13

Other compilations of the victims of the Brazilian armed forces" first wave of political
purges can be found in Edmar Morel, 0 Golpe Comecou em Washington (1965) and in John
W . F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises, 1955-1964 (1970).
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application by the president and related security agencies. In a very real
sense, the Brazilian president acted (and continues to act) as an umpire in
the political system. 18
Unlike many of the praetorian's "legal" techniques, the official approval of published materials has long been part of Brazilian life (Skidmore, 1967, p . 36). While instances of political prohibition occurred
prior to the present regime (]omal do Brasil, 8/30/1961), censorship since
1945 usually affected only the moral or sexual content of books, films,
radio, records, and television. Predictably, the military government
transformed the Censorship Service into a comprehensive and oppressive
guardian of the moral and political order (Schmitter, 1973, p. 217;
Pierce, 1979, pp. 23-54). It was not uncommon to find several hundred
items banned in a given year (Veja, 6/8/1975), thus the existence of
vigorous censorship created "delicate relationships" between the mass
media and the government (Veja, 6/29/1977). As noted in the opening
section, the degree of state control over public media varied remarkably.
Essentially, the press found itself engaged in a continuing joust with the
censors over the precise borders of political expression. Artists, composers, scholars, and writers constantly had to test the somewhat elastic
limits of "semifreedom" as delineated by the censors.
In order to control dissent the Brazilian armed forces erected "the most
massive censorship operation in the Western hemisphere and perhaps in
the noncommunist world" (Pierce, 1979, p. 27). Responsibility for
enforcing the numerous acts and decrees was given over to a bewildering
array of intelligence and police units, such as the National Intelligence
Service (S.N.I.), the Department of Political and Social Order
(D.O.P.S.), the federal police, the military police, and the police of the
several states. 19 An Operations Center for Internal Defense (C.O.D.I.)
functioned in each state. I.P.M.s (Inqueritos Policial-Militar-MilitaryPolice Investigations) became a common practice for tracking down
"subversion." Soon after their establishment the zealousness and ambi•• President Figueiredo"s handling of the 1981 bomb attempt at the Riocentro is a recent
example of the Brazilian presidenfs role as an arbiter between political forces. Investigation
of the incident directly incriminated top officials in the First Army who were believed to be
trying to frighten or warn the pro-abertura group that was sponsoring a May Day music concert. With moderate politicians backing the President, the cou nter-intelligence section of the
First Army tried to blame left-wing terrorists. However, other officers such as Admiral Julio
de Sa Bierrenbach, who sat on the Military Supreme Court, criticized the results of the official
inquiry (Levine, 1982, pp. 60-61). Eventually, internal discord in the military was papered
over by an apparent bargain in which President Figueiredo agreed not to sanction the officers
responsible for the bombing on the condition that the commanders deactivate the right-wing
terrorist section (Fleischer, 1981, pp. 41-42).
19 An indepth analysis of the operation of the intelligence agencies headquartered in
Brasilia and their relation to the workings of presidential decision making can be found in De
Goes (1978, pp. 23-60) .
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tion of lower rank officers led to the I.P.M.s' degeneration into an "indiscriminate use of authority and power and the paying-off of old scores,
personal and political" (Flynn, 1978, p. 332). In addition to the government's own security forces unofficial, vigilante-style groups appeared
during the late 1960s and through the 1970s to exacerbate the life of the
opposition. The dreaded "Death Squads" (Esquadrao da Morte), the
Commandos for Hunting Communists (C.C.C.), and the OBAN (Operation &ndeirantes) all engaged in an imaginative variety of brutal attacks
on political figures who were deemed unacceptable to the vigilantes'
powerful allies who bankrolled the repressive activities. 20 The Brazilian
political control forces- official and unofficial- became internationally
infamous for their use of torture while interrogating prisoners. Though
controversy continues to surround the exact extent of the torture and
police repression (Alves, 1973; Feichter, 1975; Lernoux, 1978), nevertheless, the various security forces constituted an ever-present threat to
bold voices.
Although this quick survey of the suppression apparatus adequately
demonstrates the regime's authoritarian character, it should not be construed as evidence that the military established a full-scale totalitarian
state. The absence of an inclusive ideology and a hegemonic party of
mobilization would preclude Brazil from this latter political condition
(Cardoso, 1973, p. 173). Also, the senior military and civilian figures in
the regime have remained divided over the use of extremely repressive
tactics and the need to widen the regime's political support and legitimacy
(the search for the so-called "second leg"). 21 At the operational level, this
division of opinion led to intermittent and ineffective attempts beginning
in 1965 through the mid-1970s to halt the indiscriminate torture and
murder. For example, in response to the public outrage over the 1975
death under torture of the well-known journalist Vladmir Herzog (and
subsequent other deaths), President Ernesto Geisel sacked General
D'Avila Melo (the army commander in Sao Paulo who had responsibility
for the situation), and shortly thereafter Geisel dismissed the head of
C. I. E. X. (Centro de lnjormacoes Exercito - Army Intelligence Center) in
20 Flynn (1978, pp. 434-435) describes links between the business community (especially in
Sao Paulo) and vigilante groups like OBAN. He goes on to detail extensive criminal activities
in drugs, prostitution, and other vices on the part of these organizations.
11 One of the principal arguments used by the praetorian regime to justify its continued
rule was its superior ability (compared to past civilian governments) to foster economic
development. However, as economic growth (the Brazilian "miracle") slowed during the
middle 1970s, some officers and their civilian allies began to search for other ways to increase
the regime's popular support. This second basis of legitimacy came to be called the "second
leg." President Geisel's policy of slowly moving toward democracy (descompressao) that
finally led to the abertura reforms can be seen as an effort to construct the "second leg"
(Flynn, 1978, pp. 480-488).
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a concerted effort to end further embarrassing incidents (Flynn, 1978, pp.
496-498). Although the Herzog affair sharply reduced the number of
"political deaths," the cassations and restrictions still continued until
1979.
Because the Brazilian military has been trapped within the participation dilemmas peculiar to mixed regiJ;Ues, the barriers to interest articulation have been in a state of flux throughout the history of the regime. Juan
Linz (1973b, p. 235), noting this ambivalence, said: "It is true that,
despite internal tensions, the military has been able to exercise power, but
their hesitant efforts to 'civilianize' their rule have had only limited success." It is the hesitancy of liberalization that makes the risks of voice
much more unpredictable in an authoritarian situation. But even in the
presence of "secret police," the indeterminate consequences of political expression make voice behavior possible.

The Oppositions Voice
From 1964 to 1979 Brazil's praetorian regime tried to silence opposition
voices with wave after wave of cassations. Despite this vigorous campaign to "sanitize" the political arena, dissent did not disappear; rather,
many voices identified serious decline in the regime's performance and
made innumerable suggestions for the improvement of public policy. By
utilizing the behavioral properties derived from Hirschman's framework,
examples of articulated discontent can be brought to bear on the participatory dilemmas occurring within mixed regimes.
The first behavioral property drawn from Hirschman's model of dissent
relates directly to the identification of voicers. Because public policy differentially affects alert citizens, Hirschman hypothesized that voice will
come from many quarters. The Brazilian case affirms this proposition
and could be demonstrated easily by a cursory examination of publications that normally were available within the country. Citizen disenchantment with post-1964 public policy cut across almost all social
categories and life styles. However, a sharp demarcation between active
and potential voicers separated labor groups from the rest of the modern
work force (McDonough, 1978). Since a major target of the military
coup was the growing political power of the enfranchised urban workers,
this group was controlled rigidly not only through the mechanism of labor
syndicates, but also through other devices such as a tightly controlled
wage policy (arrocho salarial), the pro-government bias of the grievance
procedures, and the use of gerrymandered representation to minimize the
vote of urban workers (Mericle, 1977, pp. 303-338). Although this corporatist leash curtailed much of labor's voice in Brazil, 22 other spokesmen
22

Beginning in May, 1978 and continuing through 1979 and into 1980 Brazil suffered
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have served as labor's surrogates. It was not unusual to hear these nonlabor voices bemoaning the inflationary erosion of the minimum wage or
decrying the deliberate disregard of safety procedures by employers and
the government. 23
Another hypothesis about the source of voice addresses the organizational character of voices. Recall Hirschman's remark that voicers expect
others to join them in expressing dissatisfaction. This implies a natural
aggregation process, provided no obstacles exist. In Brazil examples of
voice at all levels of organization except alliances flourished. In confirmation of Hirschman's thesis about "connoisseurs," some of the most visible manifestations of personal voice came from: (a) individuals with problems or viewpoints which attracted the attention of the mass media, (b)
free-lance as well as university-based intellectuals, and (c) many performing artists. 24 Moving to small and middle-sized groups, all manner of
associations, clubs, leagues, and movements evolved at the grassroots
(Schmitter, 1971; Alves, 1981). At the level of large-scale organizations,
again diversity of voicers prevailed, ranging from traditional institutions
such as the National Council of Catholic Bishops to modern, industrywide lobbying organizations (Blume, 1968; Bruneau, 1972; Dye and
Souza e Silva, 1979).
The one organizational level prohibited by the government was the
broad coalition. Other than the officially recognized opposition party
(MDB), 25 the praetorian regime moved to dismember serious attempts at
construction of any opposition front. For example, after the breakup of
through wave after wave of labor unrest. These strikes were the first serious union actions
since the 1964 coup (Levine, 1980, pp. 50-51). Led by the large and significant
Metalworkers Union of Sao Bernardo do Campo (a powerful auto workers organization in
Sao Paulo), the strikes broke the regime's controlled wage policy and established a "new trade
union movement" no longer tied to the old sindacto or corporatist system (Alves, 1981, pp.
21-30).
23 Besides the more "academic" studies by research institutes like the Fundacao Getulio
Vargas, most periodical news magazines carried stories describing the plight of the working
class. A cartoon representative of the working class and their troubles (entitled Orelhao)
became very popular.
24 Two theater groups provide a fascinating example of combining intellectuals, artists,
and individuals willing to act as "angels." Grupo Opiniao in Rio and Teatro de Arena in Sao
Paulo were in the vanguard of protest theater since 1965. Though their subjects were serious,
both theater groups have managed to evade censorship by hiding behind comedy (Thomas,
1972).
25 As an effort to control political competition and to avoid the image of a military dictatorship, President Castello Branco abolished the pre-1964 political parties in October, 1965
and in December, 1965, he permitted the establishment of two political parties: (1) the National Alliance for Renovation (ARENA), the pro-government party, and (2) the Brazilian
Democratic Movement (MOB), the "official" party of opposition (Schneider, 1971, pp.
173-15). This "artificial" party system lasted until the 1979 party reform which reestablished
a multiparty system.
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the Frente Ampla ("broad front") in 1968 (Schneider, 1971, p. 262), opposition voices turned cautious about alliance building lest they run afoul
of AI-5. This obstacle to multiple group coalitions did not prevent individuals and groups from voicing in concert on significant policy questions. Whether the issue was inflation, the excesses of the "Death
Squads," or controlling meningitis, thematic convergence, in effect, came
to substitute for formal organizational links. 26 Some tentative steps to
construct an opposition alliance were initiated during the 1977-78
presidential succession politics. The normal factional feuds within the
military (e.g., the Figueiredo vs. Frota intrigues) over presidential succession were augmented by the appearance of two other candidates,
Magalhaes Pinto and Bentes Monteiro. Though neither challenger won
the presidency, Monteiro, the candidate of the MDB, attracted a surprisingly large following. Levine (1979, p. 71) observes " ... for the first
time in 14 years, businessmen, labor leaders, and intellectuals spoke out
publicly alongside of the MDB politicians." During this same period
President Geisel, in response to the gains made by the MDB in 1976 and
1978, put forward a new party "reform" (effective January 1, 1979)
which was designed to encourage realignments and the birth of additional
political parties. According to Fleischer (1981, pp. 19-21), the government "calculated" that the party reorganization would splinter the opposition and thus allow ARENA to retain an absolute majority in the national congress. 27
With a spectrum of individuals, groups, and organizations expressing
policy viewpoints it naturally follows that the remedies sought would be
equally diverse. Hirschman's conceptualization of voice suggests that
discontent over quality decline will be articulated first on policies which
have personal impact, and especially on those policies which touch on the
"quality of life," such as housing, education, and civilliberties. 28 It is inte During this period (1964-79) one could pick up almost any Sunday edition of the ]ornal
do Brasil and find in its Cademo Especial section well-developed essays on many public issues
by spokespersons representing a range of different viewpoints. The other major papers and
magazines, despite the censors, also managed a lively discussion of many public questions.
27 Pang (1981, pp. 57-58) provides a concise review of the 1979 return to a multiparty
system in Brazil. In brief, through the last half of the 1970s, the pro-government ARENA
party increasingly lost strength (in terms of delegates and senators in the national congress and
governors and representatives in the states) to the opposition MOB party. As part of the
democratization policy, the regime took a calculated gamble (with good odds) that changes in
the rules governing elections and political parties would divide the unified opposition and
result in a fragmented and quarrelsome set of opposition parties. The divide-and-conquer
strategy worked as expected; five opposition parties and one pro-government party came into
existence (F1eischer, 1981).
u Complaints about basic public goods and services, according to Hirschman (1970, p.
53), should be more frequent and with more volume "in societies in which social mobility is
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teresting to observe that the praetorian regime, in response to substantial
complaints about slum conditions (e.g., ]ornal do Brasil, October and
November, 1971), launched large-scale housing projects (Manchete, no.
991). A similar voice-and-response sequence happened in educational
policy (Haussman, 1971). On the other hand, government response in
the area of civil liberties, despite a steady litany of dissatisfaction, proceeded very slowly. 29 Problems of national scope and their potential
remedies (often at odds with government policy) likewise have comprised
a fair share of Brazilian voice behavior. Besides extensive media attention to topics like regional imbalance, pollution, illiteracy, and malnutrition, an abundant supply of objective policy analyses were purchased
readily in most bookstores. Many of these volumes were written by
scholars held suspect by the regime (Schmitter, 1970, pp. 123-128). 30 In
fact, these critical analyses were recommended reading in university
classes on Brazilian public policy (Torloni, 1976).
The extensive enunciation of desired remedies within Brazil
demonstrates that an admittedly limited, but nevertheless salutary, national debate on the course of public action remained alive through the
whole period. However, an authoritarian regime propped up by a police
state apparatus seems anomalous with open policy debate. Ames (1976,
p. 282) provides a partial explanation. According to his research on
Brazilian policy making, the military regime came to power without
many intensely held policy goals. Other than in crucial economic and
security areas (Stepan, 1971; Flynn, 1978, pp. 519-521), the praetorians
allowed the traditional policy process to proceed with little or no
modification. To facilitate its political and economic doctrines the
Brazilian military relied on a voice-response sequence to generate some
legitimacy for the regime (Fiechter, 1975, pp. 207 -212).
The effort to put the organization "back on the track" casts the voicer in
the role of policy opponent. An extension of Hirschman's logic yields the
following hypothesis: as the overall quality of public goods declines,

inhibited .. . everyone has a strong motivation to defend the quality of life at his own station.··
29 After President Geisel's actions in response to the Herzog affair, public airings of police
abuse became more frequent. One typical example of personal discontent over the quality of
civil liberties was a newspaper interview of a manual laborer falsely accused of murdering a
police officer. The story, including the victim's picture (with the corporal damage visible),
detailed the laborer's unrest and subsequent torture; it should be noted that the local police
commander was reprimanded for the incident (lorna/ do Brasil, 4/14/1977). Similarly, after
the Herzog affair, the courts began to award monetary settlements for damage caused by torture.
30 Some of the more well-known authors are Caio Prado Junior, Fernando Cardoso, Octavio Ianni, and Paulo Freire.
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discontent will be voiced increasingly about policies central to the regime.
Again, as with the previous aspects of voice behavior, the types of policies
opposed cover a wide span of government action. Rather than catalogue
the totality of disliked policies, a focus on some of the more central programs of the military government, such as economic development, territorial integration, and social peace (Torloni, 1976, pp. 34-35) will suffice.
Economic development was given the highest priority by the military
after the 1964 coup d'etat. The resulting "miracle" temporarily salved
the conscience of the middle-class supporters of the regime, but once the
economy faltered, many citizens began to have second thoughts about
their saviors. The consequent dissatisfaction soon generated a significant
volume of voice and the government's popularity plummetted (Sanders,
1973). Since the first problems appeared in the "miracle," the government has been confronted with a constant drumbeat of discontent, which
has ranged from the sophisticated criticism of the "phantom cabinet of the
republic of Ipanema" (Fiechter, 1975: 125)31 to the September, 1978 mass
petition (signed by more than one million Brazilians) calling for a price
freeze (Levine, 1979, p. 71) to the more recent epidemic of labor strikes
throughout the country (Veja, 4/4/1979; Alves, 1981).
Territorial integration policies likewise suffered under attacks of voice.
Although any plan to improve the lot of the poverty-ridden population in
Northeastern Brazil would be difficult at best, the military regime,
according to its critics, selected projects only for their publicity value instead of funding truly beneficial ones. 32 Policies designed to foster social
peace also were targets for the regime's critics, as exemplified by Lucio
Kowarick's book The Logic of Disorder: Capitalist Expansion in the
Metropolitan Area of Sao Paulo and by Candido Ferreira de Camargo's
book Sao Paulo 1975 - Growth and Poverty. 33 Even in the areas of procedural policy the government's suppressive apparatus did not prevent
loud voices from speaking out against such basic regime practices as Al-5,
censorship, repeated closings of the national legislature, reliance on indirect and manipulated elections, and official corruption.
31 Led by Roberto Campos, former economic minister under Castello Branco, the
"shadow cabinet" carried on a running debate over economic policy with the Costa e Silva
cabinet, headed by Delfim Neto, the finance minister.
32 Some typical stories about the failures of territorial integration policies are: (a) "The
Routine of Calamity" (Veja, 6/2/1976) , (b) an interview with the Boas brothers on the shortcomings of Indian policy (0 Pasquim , No. 412), and (c) a special Sunday section devoted toN.
E. Brazil (fomal do Brasil, 6/1/1977).
33 Camargo's book, which was co-sponsored by Cebrap and the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo,
describes urban life from the city dweller's perspective. Its portrayal of Sao Paulo's maladies
captures the economic contradictions operating against the working class and outlines the
structure of power which marginalized the poor. Cebrap (Brazilian Center of Analysis and
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Fernando Gasparian, editor of the weekly magazine Opiniao, which
was forced to close in 1977, offered his own view of policy topics considered by the regime to be too sensitive for free discussion:" ... we cannot publish anything about oil, state monopolies, 'risk contracts, • balance
of payments, income distribution, (and) atomic energy" (Visao, 7/4/1977;
Pierce, 1979, pp. 32-33). Other features of the regime for which voice
taboos existed were the personalities of the current administration
(especially the president) and the "honor" of the armed forces. The
precedent confirming the "off-limits" character of the military was the
Alves affair of 1968 (Schneider, 1971, pp. 271-275). In sum, other than
the indicated topics, few regime policies escaped voice in Brazil. This inclusive articulation of dissatisfaction substantiates Hirschman's statement
that "connoisseurs" "actively support their vision of quality." Hirschman's
related assertion that alert citizens "feel they have nowhere else to go and
therefore have maximum incentive to articulate dissatisfaction" also
receives confirmation from these examples.
If, as Hirschman commented, voice requires inventiveness, then the
Brazilian case easily validates the supposition. As would be expected, the
openness of voice fluctuated with the degree of repression. But even in
the period labeled by Schneider (1971, p. 241) as "the descent into dictatorship," some voices always managed to be heard. For example,
despite the presence of AI-5 and the security forces, the publication of
criticism never ceased, as the mocking cartoons of Henfil, Lan, and
Ziraldo attest . In newspapers and in anthologies these political cartoonists derided the regime on multiple topics: (a) the Death Squads, (b)
the strategies of the pro-government party (ARENA), (c) development
programs to assist N.E . Brazil, (d) the cost of living, (e) election procedures, (f) government corruption, and (g) the errors of cabinet ministers
and public agencies. Significantly, caricatures of the president and the
armed forces demonstrably were absent from their work. However, the
armed forces did not escape totally the sting of voice. Some of the more
popular comedy writers incorporated less than flattering images of the
military into their artistic productions. 34
Voice in Brazil has been more than circumspect. Seemingly in
adherence with Hirschman's prescription that direct, public voice is the
most effective, some organizations challenged the regime frontally. InPlanning) was headed in the 1970s by Fernando Cardoso and was a main source of ··voice",
much to the consternation of the business community in Sao Paulo. Especially galling was
Cebrap's ability to win research contracts and grants from various government entities.
34
For example, see Chico Anisio's (1975) collection of satirical short stories entitled Teie
Preso (You're Under Arrest! ). Also, satirical TV shows such as "Chico City" and "Pianeta dos
Homens" were very popular. The latter commonly used puppets with the likenesses of the
President, Cabinet Ministers, and other well-known personalities.
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stitutional actors like the Catholic Church, following the Brazilian tradition of conciliation (Rose, 1966), have tried to make peace with the
military, while at the same time trying to retain their freedom to complain about selected issues-e.g., torture, controls on the Church's activities, social justice, amnesty. redemocratization, and support for
workers' rights. Through this entire time the Catholic hierarchy often
left the pulpit to make dramatic gestures to prod the regime along the
path of social justice (Bruneau, 1974). Besides its expected defense of
clergy from abuse by the security forces, the Church supported with many
public pronouncements a diverse set of lay organizations such as ACO
(Catholic Workers' Action), ACR (Rural Catholic Action), JAC (Catholic
Agrarian Youth), JUC (Catholic University Youth), and JOC (Young
Catholic Workers). The hierarchy often took the lead to forge links with
other groups, as exemplified by the amnesty campaign headed by Archbishop Arns of Sao Paulo (Latin American Political Report, 10/6/1978) .
Publishers of major newspapers and magazines also fought a series of
running battles with the regime and its censors. At one time or another
almost every national newspaper and magazine fell under some degree of
censorship (DeCew, 1978) . But the restrictions did not prevent the
media from printing stories and editorials which hardly gave comfort to
the regime. 35 The press, according to Pierce (1979, pp. 28-54), took advantage of the erratic rules and challenged the decisions of the censorship
service. 36 More provocative to the regime were the alternative
media- or "midget press." This group included many nationally known
3l5 The following editorials which appeared after the 1977 closure of the national congress
exemplify the voice behavior of the media: (a) "Esperanca Vazia," or "Empty Hope"
(5/16/1977), referring to "decompression" (i.e., democratization) policy; (b) "Espacos
Vazios," or "Empty Spaces" (5/17/ 1977), referring to the closure of Congress; (c)
"Democracia Distante," or "Remote Democracy" (7/3/1977) ; and (d) "Risco de Ditadura," or
"The Risk of Dictatorship" (7/6/1977).
Although some newspapers had been closed (temporarily or permanently), the regime's
strategy for controlling the media was seldom so blunt. Instead, the regime applied coercion
through less visible forms of pressure. For example, the }omal do Brasil, the country's most
influential paper (Schneider, 1971 , p. 377), carried on a running editorial battle with the
government following the April package of 1977 (for details, see Anderson, 1978, p. 62). In
retaliation for the editorials (listed above), the government withdrew all public announcements and advertisements from the JB's pages, which caused a revenue loss of about 20
percent. Though this hurt financially, the paper's directors decided not to give in and continued the anti-regime editorials. The main anxiety focused on newsprint supply; that is,
would the government cut off the JB's overseas supply?
30 Some newspapers refused the censors space to do their work, creating the paradoxical
situation of a censor forced to review articles out on the sidewalk in front of the paper's headquarters (New York Times, 4/3/1976). Other examples of mischievous media counterretaliation to censorship included the printing of absurd recipes or figures in place of censored
stories and the posting of censored articles on the newspaper's outside bulletin board (Pierce,
1979: 28-32).
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satirical and intellectual publications such as Opiniao, Pasquim,
Movimento, Ex, and Mais Um. Some were short lived, others were
closed and returned under a new title, and others struggled under varying
degrees of censorship. The important point is their existence and their
ability to voice disagreement with the regime's policies.
Through the application of Hirschman's logic to interest articulation
within the Brazilian political system, a number of limits on voice behavior
imposed by the praetorian governors can be identified. Given the
military's original motives for intervention, the prohibition of openly defiant , nationwide (or even local) alliances is the most distinguishable and
easily understood limit on voice. One can suggest that without this limit
the regime would have lost its authoritarian character. Along with this
fundamental strategic restraint, proscribed topics fell within the relatively narrow confines of the nature of the regime, its principal
spokesman, and its crucial policies. Other than the marginalized labor
groups (urban and rural), the regime did not effectively prevent the expression of voice by individuals and groups from a large part of the
literate population. "What is striking in Brazil is the very great variety of
structures represented and the multiple levels and axes along which the
political universe crystallizes" (Chalmers, 1972, p. 62). Put another way,
the basic structure of interest articulation in Brazil parallels that found in
other mixed regimes characterized by "semi-opposition" (Linz, 1973, pp.
191-210).
Safety Zones for Voicers

During the lifespan of AI -5 the Brazilian praetorian government
stripped 4,682 persons of their political rights, or an average of slightly
more than one person per day between 1968 and 1978 (Vision,
1127/1979). Yet, in the face of these arbitrary judgments the policy formulation process was characterized by a rather extensive and
sophisticated public debate. The paradox of articulated discontent side
by side with active suppression is the essence of the participation dilemmas that occur within mixed regimes. To understand more about this
situation attention must be given to the capacity of voicers to avoid or
neutralize political constraints and to enlarge their zone of political
safety.
The most common interpretation of Brazilian politics has depicted it as
a type of patrimonial elite system (Roett, 1973). Though some adherents
to this viewpoint argue that the ruling groups form a tight-knit tropical
power elite (Lernoux, 1978), most versions portray a substantial degree of
inter-elite competition over policy issues (McDonough, 1978), and thus fit
into the more general model of Latin American politics proposed by
Anderson (1967) and elaborated upon by Chalmers (1972; 1977), Malloy
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justification for the praetorian intervention, then the regime, because of
feedback requirements, must permit some degree of voice.
A second approach to the toleration of opposition with the Brazilian
mixed regime emphasizes the political/economic resources of the voicers
and the concomitant weaknesses of the military rulers. For example,
some voice will evade regime controls because of the technological costs
and inefficiencies associated with comprehensive police forces (Linz,
1973a, p. 226). More typically, although the military can cleanse the
public arena of popular politicians, ifcannot totally liquidate professional
and technical personnel. In fact , the military may well become highly
dependent on specialists in public agencies and on civilians with experience in financial and managerial operations (Nordlinger, 1977, pp.
119-122). To paraphrase Hirschman, if the alert citizens have "nowhere
to go" to find quality products, neither does the military have "anywhere
to go" to produce quality public products. 41 The Brazilian case, perhaps
more than any other present praetorian government, has exhibited a close
mutual interaction between the officer corps and the civilian managers of
capitalist institutions (Sanders, 1973). In terms of voice safety, the policy
disagreements that will occur naturally among economic movers and
shakers (e.g., the type and impact of income tax deductions) will open a
large field within which voicers can maneuver safely. Second , strong
critical opinions by influential economic figures will be tolerated because
political reprisals for economic viewpoints would chill the regime's relationships with its technical support. 42 Third, individuals and groups
with specific economic resources can and do exert policy pressure successfully, especially in areas where the regime lacks clear policy goals. 43
•• Nordlinger (1977) in a chapter entitled "Officers as Governors'' elaborates on the
Brazilian military's extreme faith in technical solutions. The extraordinary managerial training necessary to achieve the upper ranks of the officer corps, as documented by Stepan (1971),
makes the Brazilian military one of the most professional of all Third World armed forces.
(The stringent requirements seem to come right out of Plato's Republic). Despite this extensive administrative background, the Brazilian military still depends heavily on civilian
technical and financial experts to formulate and implement national policy (e.g., see 0
Militocivili.smc, /ornal do Brasil, 4/ 12/1973).
42 The resignation-in-protest of Severo Gomes, President Geisel's first minister of industry
and commerce, serves as a good case-in-point. Gomes was a discordant voice arguing for less
dependency on external capital and for an economics of social justice. Shortly after his
resignation he released a collection of his lectures under the title 0 Tempo de Mudar ("A Time
to Change"), which took direct aim at the government's policy of state enterprises and the
lack of democracy in the country. Comes was not stripped of his political rights upon
publication of this volume.
43 An ironic example of conflicting goals pitting the regime against different economic
viewpoints has been the government's campaign to conserve gasoline. On one side has been
General Oziel de Almeida Costa, president of the National Petroleum Council, who has
pressured bus companies and the owners of private airplanes, sports cars, and yachts to go
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For many of the same reasons the military has had to enter into mutual
arrangements with citizens whose major resources are predominantly
political. For example, Skidmore (1973, p. 9) documents the Brazilian
military's reliance on old-time moderate-to-conservative politicians
(primarily from the former UDN Party) for a variety of purposes. 44 When
mixed regimes are built with a significant civilian base, as in Brazil
(Pedreira, 1975), the armed forces out of necessity must accommodate
their civilian partners. Therefore, less than rigid boundaries on voice
behavior will be enforced. At the same time, because the mixed regime
depends on civilian support, Hirschman's solution- i.e. , the threat of
·
exit - becomes a viable bluff.
Another basic protection for voicers evolves from the social character of
many transitional societies. In countries like Brazil familial and friendship ties condition policy conflict (Schneider, 1971, p. 33). Societal relationships based on parentela, compadresco, and panelinha linkages create
an elaborate set of connections cutting across social institutions. More
simply put, "good old boy networks" underpin much of Brazilian politics.
Although informal networks can maintain the status quo, they also can
moderate the consequences of interpersonal and group conflict. For example, when faced with a group of protestors who are "connected" to important military and/or civilian personages, the security police have
found themselves in a "no-win" situation. 45 Turning this point around,
because of social linkages the Brazilian military is not a closed corporation, rather "the military, like any other citizens, are susceptible to the
same winds that sweep public opinion in general ... " (Pedreira, 1975, p.
507) .
One last form of voice insurance depends upon a person's (or group's)
easy on fuel. On the other side, one finds Cabramar, the largest manufacturer of recreational boats, allied with Embraer, the state industry producing private airplanes. All the
while, of course, little effect has been felt by either the wealthy sportsmen or the small
businessmen and laborers who depend on resort trade (Veja, 3/14/1979).
44 See, for example, "Velhas Familias Politicas Continuam Atuantes," or "The Old
Political Families Continue Operating" (!omal do Brasil, 8/4/1974). Even though Tancredo
Neves (a leader in the old PSD) described the 1964 Revolution with the now well-known label
"Estado Novo da UDN," some very important dissident voices came from the old UDN (National Democratic Union) ranks, in particular Magalhaes Pinto and Pedro Aleixo.
45 During the nationwide student uprisings in 1977 and 1978, the police forces often were
stymied in their attempts to control the situation. For example, at the Federal University of
Brasilia the police were under orders to go easy since the international press was covering the
event. Still, some students were badly injured, and after being hauled to detention centers,
the police then discovered that many of the student protestors were the children or relatives of
highly placed military and civilian officials of the national government. The ensuing
brouhaha allowed the students to exploit the police's dilemma and thus generate valuable national attention for their grievances.
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status or popularity. Recall that Hirschman hypothesized the protective
quality of prominence. Even in the most totalitarian system the peccadilloes of national heroes are overlooked. In less firmly entrenched
mixed regimes mass affection for performing artists and athletes may exceed that accorded to the president. To move directly against a popular
figure could easily create a martyr and play into the hands of the violent
"exiters." Instead, the regime becomes trapped in a subtle game of "cat
and mouse" with popular figures who engage in voice. 46
Voicers, in summary, develop safety zones not only out of their own
resource base, but also within the structural anomalies and organizational
behavior of the regime. Dahl (1973, p. 16) reminds us, "since at least
limited opportunities are available to oppositions, some oppositional
elements will almost certainly use their opportunities to press for further
lowering of the barriers." By pressing at the margins of permitted expression, voicers can enhance their bargaining advantage with the regime.
Although voicers may not be in agreement on a given policy or strategy,
their aggregated efforts can enlarge the area of public discourse and
possess the potential to influence policy decisions.
VoicE AND THE "TENSioNs" WITHIN AuTHORITARIAN SYSTEMS

What does Hirschman's "individualistic" approach to dissent add to the
study of Brazilian politics and to the more general study of interest articulation in non-democratic systems? Do the categories of citizen
response to deterioration in government policies- exit, voice, and
loyalty-offer a useful analytic approach to the participation dilemmas in
a mixed regime? Does the concept of "voice" aid in explaining the persistence and survival of non-violent opposition within bureaucratic/
authoritarian politics?
From the viewpoint of one school of Brazilian political analysis it is
possible to argue that all of the safety factors for voice listed here are
trivial. This perspective defines any individual who possesses economic,
•e The performing artist most famous for his continual '"cat and mouse" game with the
praetorian regime has been Chico Buarque de Hollanda, who composes and sings his own
songs as well as writes allegorical short stories. Some of his compositions have been censored,
whereas others have been approved, although everyone could read his meanings between the
lines. He even has written subtle children's songs to counteract the regime's educational
materials (see Os Saltimbancos). A cynic might comment that Hollanda's '"game" was
merely a scheme to boost his popularity and his profits. Even if one grants this motive, his
songs such as Pedro Pedreiro and Meu Caro Amigo served to inspire voice. Also, Hollanda
was not without colleagues in this "game." Other composer-singers who tested the limits of
expression include Gilberto Gil, Nara Leao, Ruy Maurity, Milton Nascimento, and Caetano
Veloso, to name a few. The point here, of course, was Chico Buarque's pressure against the
indeterminate limits of "semifreedom" -sometimes he succeeded, sometimes he failed ; but
the regime was careful not to resort to· physical reprisals.
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TABLE

2

PoLITICAL PuNISHMENT IN BRAZIL

Politicians
Liberal Professions
and Businessmen
Civil Servants
Military
Judicial Officers
Blue Collar and
White Collar Workers,
Urban and Rural
Without Identification
Totals

45, 1983

BY

OccuPATION

1st Cycle
(1964)

2nd Cycle
(1965-66)

3rd Cycle
(1968-71)

Totals

227

77

352

656 (63 %)

46
23
38
9

37
17
50
2

34
7
9
4

117 (11 %)
47 (5%)
97 (9%)
15 (1 %)

26
11
380

30
25

6
16
428

62 (6 %)
52 (5%)
1046(100%)

238

Source: Marcus F . Figueiredo, "P unishment Cycles and Authoritarian Consolidation,
1964 to 1971."" Rio de Janeiro, IUPERJ, 1974 (mimeograph).

political, and/or social resources as a member of the sistema ("establishment") (DosSantos, 1974, pp. 459-486) . Furthermore, outside of these
influential elites no true opposition survives (Quartim, 1971) . This
model divides Brazilian society into a unified elite and a downtrodden
mass. The examples of voice behavior described in this essay raise questions about the failure of the homogeneous elite model to explain a
number of important aspects of interest articulation in Brazil. First, the
existence of elites does not necessarily imply a closed, oligarchic decision
structure (Payne, 1968) . As previously noted, competitive elites who try
to mobilize middle- or lower-class followings have incentives to open, not
close, debate. Second, elites act to redress citizens' personal grievances, if
for no other reason than to strengthen patron-client ties. Third, on a
large scale, because the Brazilian praetorian regime has been committed
to "development" and its legitimacy has rested partially on performance,
the regime has had to strive to satisfy fundamental "quality of life" needs,
or risk smoldering discontent . Fourth, the social origins of the Brazilian
armed forces, coupled with the informal social networks, have produced
a politically heterogeneous officer corps with very close links to the middle sectors (Stephan, 1971, pp. 30-56).
A more accurate view of the opposition's place within Brazilian politics
postulates a direct relation between the segmentos ilustrados
(cultured/educated sectors) and the coercive aspects of the regime. Coelho
(1976, pp. 180-185), using data gathered by Marcus Figueiredo (see Table
2) , argues that the regime concentrated its purges on these elite sectors
precisely because they possess the resources necessary to challenge the
regime. Coelho contends that the civilian political class and other
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members of the segmentos ilustrados bore the brunt of the regime's restrictions because the military and the "technobureaucracy," who sit at the
center of policy making, utilized a social control strategy based on elite
isolation. That is, the regime tried to separate the different segmentos
ilustrados from each other. However, this strategy has not been totally
successful; Coelho describes the activity of "legal dissidents" who have
carved out "areas of experimentation" which functioned as safety valves
for a regime which has not been able to institutionalize itself. In conclusion, Coelho suggests that the "areas of experimentation" permitted the
regime to evaluate more correctly the risks of policies designed to foster
abertura.
Walder De Goes (1978, p. 17) in his book on the presidency of General
Geisel elaborates with additional detail the position taken by Coelho. De
Goes (1978, pp. 17-23) addresses "the contradictions inside the militarybureaucratic system" which contributed to political disequilibrium and,
in turn, imposed limits on the power of the president. In a section entitled "Ideas About the Future," De Goes (1978, p. 127) outlines the
strategic ideas underlying negotiations between "the integral forces of the
regime and the elites who are in dissent" and points out,
These ideas flow from a simple rationale: it is necessary to make changes sufficiently rapid
and deep so as not to accumulate destabilizing frustrations with the regime, but not so fast
and so deep as to threaten the primacy of the forces that currently dominate the political
system (De Goes, 1978, pp. 127-128).

Discovering this delicate balance, De Goes argues, has been crucial to the
regime's continuation because failure to develop creative solutions could
lead to a political explosion. 47
Coelho and De Goes offer a description of Brazilian politics which captures what O'Donnell (1979, pp. 285-318) calls "the tensions in the
bureaucratic-authoritarian state." From 1964 to the 1979 abertura
policy, the Brazilian military government did not permit unrestrained
public opinion formation, yet it did not quash all public debate. Rather,
as with all mixed regimes, the government struggled with the inherent
paradox of the participation dilemmas. From the government's side of
the quandary, extreme suppression would have alienated many regime
allies and shortcircuited the voice-response mechanism necessary to
performance-based legitimacy. From the opposition's side of the quandary, the indeterminant zone of "semifreedom" made articulation of dissent risky, but also possible and fruitful. Opposition voices, although
they did not always escape political and physical reprisals, managed to
47 The Figueiredo Governmenfs democratization policy of abertura can be seen as an effort to find a "creative solution:· in De Goes" terms, between the pro-regime forces and the
elites in dissent.
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keep up a persistent stream of demands which the regime could not shunt
aside. Over time voicers established their political positions to the point
where the praetorian rulers had to negotiate with the "dissident elites" in
order to secure continuing legitimacy and to avoid system disruption. According to Fleischer (1981, p. 39), it is just such bargaining between the
government and the opposition that led the president's political strategists
to urge the adoption of the current democratization policy.
Hirschman's rational model of dissent can provide an explanatory
framework for organizing some components of regime-dissident relationships in Brazil. First, Hirschman's categories of response to organizational deterioration-exit, voice, and loyalty -can assist in identifying
and sorting out the different types of political actors operating within the
praetorian regime. The behavioral properties of the three forms of
response allow the analyst to distinguish more accurately, for example,
between two businessmen in Brazil- one who articulates discontent
about a regulation governing the stock exchange versus one who articulates discontent with the policy of estatizacao (state control of
economic activity). Second, the propositions derived from Hirschman's
model can guide the discovery of patterns of opposition behavior. By
transcending chronological details, the content and style of dissent can be
linked to the strategic choices of the opposition (either as individuals or as
a collective entity or group). Thus, as already noted, fluctuations in the
topics and the prominence given to them by the mass media can be related
to regime repression as well as to editorial decisions. Finally, by drawing
attention to the voicers' capacity to construct political "safety zones,"
Hirschman's framework makes a start at accounting for the opposition's
survival in the face of the regime's use of coercion.
Some aspects of Brazilian political life do not fit neatly into the
Hirschman formulation. A particularly vexing problem flows from the
element of choice and the identification of voicers and loyalists. Since individuals and groups can move back and forth between the different
forms of response behavior, the consistent classification of an individual
or group into one category may be precluded. Another troublesome issue
for the model involves the problem of propaganda. Other than suggesting some motives for loyalty (e.g., trading allegiance for tangible
rewards) , the logic of the framework ignores the organization/regime's
capacity for manipulation which could affect the "connoisseur's" judgment about deterioration. On balance, Hirschman's approach to dissent
shifts the analytic focus away from the praetorian regime's capacity for
societal control and onto the voicer's ability to win concessions, and thus
contributes to a more accurate and r~alistic understanding of the
dynamics of Brazilian politics.
At a more general comparative level, Hirschman's model of voice
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behavior amplifies the work of Dahl, Linz, O'Donnell, and others on the
character of participation in an authoritarian setting. Cardoso (1979, p.
48), for example, lists three factors governing the capacity for
authoritarian control: (1) the circumstances under which the regime came
to power, (2) the degree of weakness or strength of the civil society, and
(3) the technical capacity for control available to the regime. The concept of voice elaborates on the "degree of weakness or strength of civil
society" through its identification of the resources and strategies that
undergird opposition survival and undermine regime control.
Hirschman's work also deductively yields propositions which can serve as
the basis for cross-cultural comparisons (for example, see Booth, 1979).
And third, this approach proposes some causal factors that account for the
"constant experiments" and "strange combinations" of participation and
choice that Linz (1973b, p. 252) has observed within contemporary
authoritarian regimes.
On the negative side, Hirschman's categories of exit, voice, and loyalty
are open to all of the standard difficulties associated with typologies. Second, the concept of voice, because it is a "micro" approach to politics,
does not address in a direct fashion the structural arrangements that also
condition the behavior of mixed regimes. Third, because "connoisseurs"
are politically exceptional individuals, the behavioral attributes of voice
do not apply necessarily to the political response of average persons living
within the context of a mixed regime. Fourth, Hirschman's framework
is, at best, a partial theory of dissent and needs to be fitted with other insights on the nature of participation within non-democratic systems (see
Collier, 1979, pp . 363-397).
In the last analysis "voice" calls attention to political behavior that
underlies the "fragilities" of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (O'Donnell, 1979, p. 310). By linking the dissatisfaction of alert citizens to the
articulation of dissent, the concept of voice has the potential for explaining the "constant experiments" with liberalization typical of mixed
regimes. As a result of this synthesis, it becomes evident, therefore, that
the boundaries of "semifreedom" in a mixed regime are not a sole function
of the barriers to participation, but rather are an interactive function between these barriers and voice behavior.
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APPENDIX

Selected Propositions Derived from A. 0 . Hirschman's, Exit, Voice and
Loyalty: Re.spome to Decline in Firms, Organizatiom, and States
Some General Propositiom
1. Considerable deterioration must build up within a firm /organization before voice occurs.
2 . Voice will be chosen if exit is unavailable or costly.
3. Voice will emanate from discontented consumers/members who possess some degree of
political/economic resources.
4. Voice will be persistent.
5. Direct, public voice will be more effective.
6. Alert customers, or "connoisseurs," will exert leverage on the firm /organization through
the threat of exit.
7. Voice will be an aggregative process.
8. Voice will be more likely about personal hardship than communal hardship.
Some Specific Propositiom Relevant to Mixed Regimes
1. As the overall quality of public goods declines, discontent will be voiced increasingly
about policies that are central to the regime.
2. Deterioration in labor-intensive public goods and services will provoke more "voice"
than declines in capital-intensive public goods and services.
3. Decline in "quality of life" policies (i.e., civil liberties) most likely will produce the most
intensive voice.
4. The boundaries of "semifreedom" will be an interactive function of voice behavior and
the regime's technical capacity for social control.

